Evidence and Agency
How should we think about what we will do when we are promising or resolving to do something difficult? And how can we make such promises and resolutions at all, since it seems that we must remain open to the thought that we might fail to follow through?
My book Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving (Oxford University Press, 2015) addresses the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. It defends a view that is inspired by Sartre: It argues that when matters are up to us, it is incumbent upon us to settle the question of what we will do by considering our practical reasons. In this way, it puts forth a distinct interpretation of the Kantian thought that we act under the idea of freedom.
Evidence and Agency is the winner of the 2016 Sanders Book Prize. The prize is awarded by the American Philosophical Association to the best book in philosophy of mind, metaphysics or epistemology that engages the analytic tradition published in English in the previous five-year period.
Evidence and Agency also received an honorable mention in the competition for the 2017 APA Book Prize.
There is also an animated video version of it on Wireless Philosophy!
In subsequent work, some of it co-authored with John Schwenkler, I consider the relationship between intentions and beliefs and the nature of practical reasoning. Our essay "Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism" won the 2017 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind.
Other essays that are part of this research project include:
“What’s Wrong with Promising to Try?”
“Belief and Difficult Action.”