Publications

Books:

On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love. Oxford University Press, 2022.

Beskrajna Ljubav. Institut za Filozofiju, Zagreb, 2021.

Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Oxford University Press, 2015.

Winner of the 2016 Sanders Book Prize

Honorable Mention for the 2017 APA Book Prize

Edited:

Analytic Existentialism, co-edited with Mark Schroeder. Oxford University Press, 2024.

Stephen J. White. Responsibility and the Demands of Morality: Collected Papers. Co-edited with Kyla Ebels-Duggan. Oxford University Press, 2025.

Articles:

“Interpersonal Reasoning: A Philosophical Psychology of Testimonial Trust.” European Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

“Reflection without Reification.” In Kornblith and His Critics, edited by Joshua DiPaolo and Luis Oliveira. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming.

“Embodied Radical Freedom: An Interpretation of Sartre’s Theory of Radical Choice.” In Analytic Existentialism, edited by Berislav Marušić and Mark Schroeder. Oxford University Press (2024): 115–32.

“Disagreement and Alienation,” with Stephen J. White. Philosophical Perspectives 37.1 (2023): 210–27.

Selected for the 2023 Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best philosophy papers of the year.

“No Grit without Freedom.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23.1 (2022): 144–51.

“Agency and Evidence,” with John Schwenkler. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, edited by Luca Ferrero. New York: Routledge, 2022: 244–53.

“Accommodation to Injustice.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau (2020): 263–83.

Runner-up for the 2017 Sanders Prize in Metaethics

“Do Reasons Expire? —An Essay on Grief.” Philosophers’ Imprint 18.25 (2018): 1–25.

“Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism,” with John Schwenkler. Analytic Philosophy 59.3 (2018): 1–32.

Winner of the 2017 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind

“How Can Beliefs Wrong? —A Strawsonian Epistemology,” with Stephen J. White. Philosophical Topics, special issue on ‘Can Beliefs Wrong?’, edited by Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder 46.1 (2018): 97–114.

“What's Wrong with Promising to Try?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98.S1 (2017): 249–56.

“Trust, Reliance and the Participant Stance.” Philosophers’ Imprint 17.17 (2017): 1–10.

“Asymmetry Arguments.” Philosophical Studies, special issue on ‘Perceptual Evidence’, edited by James Genone 173.4 (2016) 1081–102.

“Promising Against the Evidence.” Ethics 123.2 (2013): 292–317. Reprinted in: Contemporary Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath. Wiley and Sons, 2019.

“The Self-Knowledge Gambit.” Synthese 190.12 (2013): 1977–99.

“Belief and Difficult Action.” Philosophers’ Imprint 12.18 (2012): 1–30.

“The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy Compass 6.1 (2011): 33–43.

“The Desires of Others.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91.3 (2010): 385–400.

“Skepticism Between Excessiveness and Idleness.” European Journal of Philosophy 18.1 (2010): 60–83.

Review:

“Review of Beyond the Philosopher's Fear by Ludger Viefhues-Bailey.” European Journal of Philosophy 18.2 (2010): 315–20.